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The surge in the supply of intermittent renewable energy creates new challenges for electricity 
networks. The high variation in the supply either requires costly network extensions or the 
implementation of incentives that reduce peaks. One variant of the latter are dynamic tariffs. While 
dynamic pricing provides an efficient tariff scheme, people may perceive it as unfair. This paper 
examines to which extent such peak pricing is actually unfair and, if so, how this unfairness can be 
lessened by adapting the tariff design. We discuss the efficiency arguments for dynamic pricing and 
subsequently the acceptability and perceived fairness. In addition, we contrast these perceptions with 
fairness criteria derived from ethical theories. We conclude that dynamic pricing does not necessarily 
need to be unfair. In particular, the fairness depends to a significant extent on the concrete tariff 
implementation. The perceived fairness of dynamic pricing can be strengthened by using the revenues 
for measures related to the grid, providing clear common-language arguments, mediating adverse 
consequences for the least well-off, and minimizing unpredictability. 
 
  
                                                     
1
 This paper is written as part of the research project “Redesigning the electricity market in order to facilitate the 
transition towards a sustainable energy system”, financed by NWO and various stakeholders in the energy 
sector. The authors thank the members of the Valorisation Board as well as the Scientific Advisory Board for 
their input during this project. The authors, however, are fully responsible for the contents of this paper. 
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1. Introduction  
The surge of renewable energy creates new challenges for electricity networks. Because of the 
intermittent character of the supply of renewable energy, the grids have to deal with high variation in 
flows and thus possible congestions. Managing such congestions will either require network 
extensions or the implementation of incentives that reduce peaks. As the former option is more costly, 
we focus on the question how network tariffs can be used to give incentives to users to adapt the 
timing (i.e. peak shifting) and level of their network use (i.e. peak shedding) to the degree of overall 
network utilisation. The solution proposed is to implement a system of dynamic pricing and in 
particular tariffs that are significantly higher during periods of high network usage, namely peak 
pricing. 
 While the potential of dynamic network tariffs have been discussed extensively in economic 
literature, here we examine to which extent such dynamic pricing is fair.2 Fairness has always been an 
important consideration of electricity-network regulators. While there has been an increasing focus on 
incentive regulation fostering efficiency in the last decades, regulators almost always state that they 
see fairness as an important goal (Jones and Mann, 2001; Muir, 2001). Fairness is seen as important 
because electricity network tariffs determine a significant proportion of the electricity bill3 and access 
to electricity is considered as a basic need. Fairness is also related to the feasibility of implementation. 
If people perceive certain policies to be unfair, they will consider them as unacceptable and possibly 
they will not support or even protest against them (Steg and Vlek, 2009, p. 314). Many experiments in 
behavioural economics and psychology have shown that fairness is an important motivational force 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2013, 2002).  
 However, there appears to be a fundamental tension here. On the one hand, efficient network 
tariffs such as based on peak pricing are seen as important, while on the other empirical research has 
shown that many people perceive peak pricing as unfair and unacceptable. This tension is the subject 
of our inquiry. In this paper, we analyse the exact content of this tension and how to deal with this 
tension in practice. 
 In Section 2, we introduce our method for examining the tension between efficiency and 
fairness of peak pricing. In Section 3, we discuss efficiency, acceptability (perceived fairness) and 
                                                     
2
 The notions of fairness, justice and equity will be used interchangeably.  
3
 In Australia network charges are responsible for about 43% ($720) of the average annual electricity bill (Wood 
and Carter, 2014, p. 13); in Belgium for about 40,5% (405€) (http://www.vreg.be/nl/energieprijs); in the 




fairness from an ethical perspective. Section 4 compares peak pricing with other ideal-type tariff 




In order to grasp the tension at stake, we will discuss the efficiency arguments for and fairness 
perceptions of peak pricing. This is, however, not enough to understand fairness comprehensively and 
therefore they need to be contrasted with insights from ethics and theories of justice. Many 
psychologists and behavioural economists understand fairness perceptions as quick and intuitive 
reactions to a situation relevant for fairness, namely as cognitive shortcuts or as reflecting partly 
unconscious fairness heuristic (van den Bos et al., 2001). Such judgements can thus biased by 
available information. Therefore, we are in need of an unbiased reflection, which is what ethics aims 
at. Moreover, even if it concerns conscious and reflective judgments, the moral rightness of an action 
is largely independent of whether someone thinks it is right or wrong. Acts such as killing or slavery 
are not wrong 'because' people think they are wrong. The fact that many people think a situation is fair 
is a good indicator of fairness but not enough to determine whether it actually is fair. What matters are 
the reasons: why is a particular situation fair? It are these arguments that are discussed in ethics and 
theories of justice: such theories represent the outcome of long-standing debates about which 
arguments are considered to be the strongest.  
 A simplistic view of ‘applied ethics’ is that ethics provides the relevant, universal principles 
and these need to be applied to the case at stake, such as network tariffs. Most theories of justice, such 
as Rawls' (1971) and Dworkin's (2000), however, deal with 'distributive justice in the large', namely 
how the general institutions of a society (constitution, labour, inheritance, etc.) should distribute 
crucial goods (such as wealth, rights, jobs, education, property and health care). These theories do not 
engage with 'justice in the small', with 'concrete, everyday distributive problems such as how to 
adjudicate a property dispute, who should get into medical school, or how much to charge for a 
subway ride' (Young, 1995, p. 6). Such 'local justice' problems (Elster, 1991a) are characterised by a 
plurality of principles that differs across spheres (e.g. medical versus educational) and across and 
within countries. The problem is not that local or small justice problems have not been examined yet, 
by applying general justice models, but rather that fairness is to a large extent a contextual notion, 
which requires understanding the context first in order to know what fairness can mean. ‘If we 
understand what it is, what it means to those for whom it is a good, we understand how, by whom, and 
for what reasons it ought to be distributed’ (Walzer, 1983, p. 9). This also holds for the literature on 
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'energy justice' (Heffron et al., 2015; Jones et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2013). While taking into account 
the specific features of energy provision, this literature does not provide specific fairness criteria for 
particular energy questions. 
 Therefore, our methodology consists of three moves: bottom-up, top-down and integration. 
The bottom-up starts from the case itself, namely the empirical results from behavioural economic 
studies. We need to understand when people think pricing is unfair and to provide a plausible 
interpretation of why they think this. Based on this, we are able to suggest plausible ways how to 
mediate unfairness perceptions. The top-down approach looks at theories of justice in order to deduce 
some general fairness criteria. These general fairness criteria will be combined with efficiency and 
acceptability criteria in order to make an integrated fairness assessment of peak pricing. 
 
3. Three perspectives: economics, behavioural economics and ethics 
3.1 Economic perspective: efficiency 
3.1.1 Dynamic tariffs 
One needs to distinguish two different problems with regard to the electricity network. First, total 
production and total consumption have to be in balance at any moment for the whole network. This 
balancing problem is dealt with at the level of the transmission grid. The second problem refers to the 
capacity of the grid to deal with the supply and usage of electricity in a particular part of the network. 
If there is a lack of capacity, the network is called to be congested. For such congestion problems there 
are broadly two solutions: local network extension or incentives to decrease use (either consumption 
or production). The latter incentives can be given through time-based (dynamic) network tariffs.  
 Dynamic pricing is not a new idea and is probably more well-known in the case of road-
pricing. Nowadays most economists agree that highway congestion can be solved by pricing; 
notwithstanding that there is considerable disagreement about the concrete implementation (Lindsey, 
2006, p. 296). In dynamic pricing, prices are allowed to react to fluctuations in demand and supply. 
William Vickrey (1971) argued to apply such responsive pricing to public utilities such as telephone, 
water, roads and electricity. While still uncommon in Vickrey's days, this is increasingly becoming a 
normal practice, such as for instance for airlines, cruise ships and hotels (Elmaghrab and Keskinocak, 
2003). The cost of networks, such as highways, railroads and electricity grids, is primarily determined 
by its peak capacity. This peak capacity is only required on the peak moments and thus the peak 
demand determines the need for future network expansion. If one is able to decrease these peaks, less 
investments in network extension are needed and, as a result, the network costs could be substantially 
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reduced. For instance, between 2009 and 2013 $17,6 billion was invested in the expansion of the 
Australian power network, but estimates say that $7,8 billion of this $17,6 billion investment could 
have been avoided by reducing the peaks through peak pricing (Wood and Carter, 2014, pp. 25–26). In 
the electricity wholesale market, such system already exists for many years, which is called peak-load 
pricing: users in off-peak period pay no more than the variable costs, while users in peak periods pay a 
price far above that level. The peak price is determined by the scarcity of capacity (supply) and the 
sensitivity of demand to prices. Peak-pricing moves the burden of the cost to those who use the 
network on the moment of maximum capacity. It also creates an incentive to decrease peak use and 
thus decreases the need for future investments in network expansion. Finally a peak-pricing system 
gives incentives for the optimal level of investments in network extension. While such a system 
already exists for the wholesale electricity market, the discussion is now whether such a system can  
be used for users of distribution grids.  
 
3.1.2 Designing tariff schemes for electricity grids 
The electricity network is a natural monopoly because it is characterised by economies of scale, 
namely high (initial) fixed cost and consequently declining average costs (Duffy, 2004, p. 40). If the 
monopolist would be allowed to set its price, this price would be higher than the competitive price, 
which causes a deadweight loss. One important strategy for dealing with this deadweight loss is tariff 
regulation. Here we briefly discuss some main design options for network tariffs, which will be used 
later for making an evaluative comparison.    
 A first straightforward option is charging a flat tariff to everyone. There is, however, a pricing 
dilemma for the regulator: if the price is equal to average costs then there remains a deadweight loss, 
but if price equals marginal cost, then there is a financial loss for the monopolist. Hotelling proposed 
in 1938 to set prices equal to marginal costs while the fixed costs should be funded by the government 
through subsidies: costs partly socialised through taxes (Hotelling, 1938, p. 242).  Coase (1946), 
however, argues that there are at least two important problems with this strategy. First, it leads to a 
misallocation of resources. Second, if the fixed cost is paid by the taxpayers then there is an 
unjustified redistribution from those who do not consume the good to those who actually consume the 
good. Coase (1946)  proposed two-part pricing in which one part of the price covers the fixed costs 
and a second part the variable, marginal costs. He assumes, however, that we could know which 
consumers are responsible for which costs – as in the case of transport: some people travel further 
distances than others. This is however more complex for the electricity network: it is not that clear 
which consumer causes which cost. This is the problem of common costs, namely costs that are 
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common to a group of consumers. If we would charge everyone equally for the common costs, we 
arrive again at the same problems as with Hotelling’s solution: misallocating resources and unjustified 
redistribution. The alternative for a single common cost price is price discrimination between groups 
or products, such as the difference between business and economy class in airplanes.  
 Another solution to the above pricing dilemma was proposed by Frank Ramsey in 1927 and 
consequently called Ramsey pricing (Train, 1991, pp. 115–145). Ramsey pricing uses an inverse 
elasticity rule: the price should be inversely related to their respective elasticity of consumers. 
Business travellers for instance can be charged a higher transport price because they are less sensitive 
for price changes. The second option for price discrimination is the tariff system we are examining 
here, namely time-based peak pricing, where peak-users are charged a higher rate. Hence, this is price 
discrimination over time. The most common tariff options are however not based on consumer 
preferences, but are meant to reflect the costs induced by the network user. First, there can be a 
transport charge, based on the amount of energy consumed (€/kWh). Second, there can be a capacity 
(or demand) charge, namely based on the maximum capacity of one’s connection (€/kWmax). This 
could also be based on the actual peak use over a year, namely the capacity actually used, which is 
seen as good performing with regard to cost reflectivity (Brown et al., 2015; Wood and Carter, 2014). 
 In order to assess the fairness of tariff designs, we compare the dynamic (peak) tariff design to 
the above mentioned types: a) a flat rate, which may be partly socialised through taxes, b) transport 
and capacity charges, and c) Ramsey pricing. 
 
3.2 Behavioral-economic perspective: community standards of fairness 
3.2.1 Fairness attitudes towards (peak) pricing 
Peak pricing seems to be a straightforward way to deal with possible congestion problems in 
electricity grids. However, the fact that it is an optimal strategy according to economic theory, does 
not necessarily imply people think of it as desirable or fair. Studies in behavioural economics have 
shown that different types of prices are evaluated differently with regard to fairness (‘community 
standards of fairness’) (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1986; Xia et al., 2004).. 
 If a good becomes scarce and it is thus not available for everyone, for instance because of 
exceptional weather conditions, people in general conceive pricing as an unfair way to deal with such 
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excess demand.4 This might be in line with observed protests against pricing based on excess demand 
(Frey and Pommerehne, 1993, p. 299), for instance recent protests against Uber's higher prices for 
peak use (Surowiecki, 2014) and Amazon's higher prices for less price-sensitive consumers (Krugman, 
2000). Such negative reactions are even stronger when it concerns a public provider rather than a 
private one (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993, p. 299). Moreover, if pricing is compared with other 
allocation mechanisms (e.g. lottery, queuing, administrative decision), people rank pricing in general 
among the least fair methods. For instance, Frey and Pommerehne (1993, pp. 299–302) found that 
'first come, first served' (queuing) was judged most fair,5 a procedure with public officials as secondly 
fair, and pricing and random allocation as least fair. 
 Behavioural economists offer the following explanation. People evaluate changes as gains or 
losses relative to a reference point, which is a price (or something) accepted as normal. This makes 
that fairness judgements primarily concern relative changes rather than absolute levels and, therefore, 
it is no surprise that people are particularly sensitive for losses (Kahneman et al., 1986, p. 739). This 
reference point determines the perceived legitimate claims of both sellers and buyers: firms are 
entitled to their reference profit and buyers have an entitlement to a particular price (principle of dual 
entitlement). Consequently, a firm cannot arbitrarily raise the price in order to increase profits; this is 
seen as unfair, because it violates the reference entitlements of the consumer. On the other hand, if 
reference profits of the firm are threatened, a price raise is seen as fair or acceptable, because the 
reference entitlement of the firm is threatened (Kahneman et al., 1986, p. 730).  
 From this starting point some reasons for a price change are seen as (un)acceptable or (un)fair. 
(i) A price increase is acceptable if the underlying costs for that product have increased. At the same 
time, people deem it acceptable that the price stays the same if costs decrease. Both refer to the 
entitlements of the seller: changing costs should not decrease the firm’s reference profits. (ii) Using 
excess demand (e.g. scarcity because of weather conditions,) or an increase in monopoly power (e.g. 
single seller in a particular community) for raising prices is perceived as strongly unfair, contrary to 
increases based on increased costs. Rather than deserving a higher price (better product, higher costs), 
such reasons are perceived as just exploiting one's market power. (iii) Price discrimination based on 
                                                     
4
 For instance, people were asked the following question: 'A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for 
$15. The morning after a large snow storm, the store raises the price to $20? Please rate this action as: 
completely fair/acceptable/unfair/very unfair' (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1986, p. 729). 
Around 80% of the respondents considers the price increase as at least unfair and even 69% judged the situation 
as “very unfair” – a result confirmed in studies in different countries. 
5
 This is partly confirmed by the resistance against road pricing, the current system is a kind of first-comes first-
served and while disadvantageous might still be preferred to road pricing (Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-
Hannemann, 2002, p. 361). 
8 
 
willingness to pay is also valued very negatively. For instance, a landlord who raises the rent because 
he learns that the tenant has taken a job close to the house and thus is less willing to move (decrease in 
price elasticity) is valued as very unfair (Kahneman et al., 1986, p. 735). (iv) Raising prices in a 
unique and unpredictable situation is seen as strongly unfair – people attach a lot of value to 
predictability and stability of prices (and this also applies to regulated tariffs (Biggar, 2010, p. 16)). 
Possibly because of this, consumers have so far been little interested in buying electricity at wholesale 
spot prices (Littlechild, 2000). Conversely, if something occurs often and is predictable, the 
acceptability of a price raise in response to excess demand increases, because consumers can adapt 
their behaviour in advance (Frey and Pommerehne, 1993, p. 303; Konow, 2003, p. 1220). 
 Recent research has provided more insights in attitudes towards peak pricing. Raux et al. 
(2009) examined people’s reactions to situations of excess demand (both exceptional and recurring), 
such as allocating seats on a high speed train and parking places in a private company car park. Other 
mechanisms than peak pricing, such as a moral rule (priority to people with reduced mobility), 
queuing, and compensation were perceived as fairer than peak pricing. Only random mechanisms, 
such as a lottery and random allocation (‘unknown administrative rule’) were perceived as less fair 
than pricing. The study of Raux et al. provide additional insights with regard to fairness and peak 
pricing. (i) First, conform with the results discussed earlier, peak pricing is seen as (a bit) more 
acceptable if it applies to recurring situations, rather than to an exceptional situation. (ii) Second, it 
seems crucial what happens with the revenues of peak pricing. If the revenues are used to provide (at 
the same time) additional supply, this increases acceptability – for instance, if the revenues are used 
for extra trains, parking spaces or driving lanes (Raux et al., 2009). Along the same lines, increased 
investments in roads are the most popular variant for road pricing schemes; more popular than a 
general tax reductions (Verhoef et al., 1997, pp. 270–271). An important criterion seems that revenues 
should stay within the same dimension: revenues should be allocated to the problem the pricing 
scheme is supposed to solve. If pricing is aimed at solving congestion, use revenues for increasing 
road capacity; if aimed at environmental quality, use revenues for environmental measures  
(Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002, p. 263). On the other hand, if one has more trust in the 




Table 1. Summary fairness perceptions towards (peak) pricing 
 
When: unfairness perception if price rise/discrimination is: 
• not based on a change in underlying costs; 
• based on excess demand, price elasticity or willingness-to-pay (market exploitation); or 
• if it is unpredictable. 
 
How to mediate: unfairness perception of peak pricing can be lessened if: 
• it concerns reoccurring, predictable situations ; 
• revenues are used to address problems at stake by e.g. additional supply ; or 




3.2.2 Understanding fairness attitudes 
Knowing when people perceive pricing as unfair and how to mediate such unfairness perception, 
however, does not provide an explanation of why people think so. Such an explanation is for two 
reasons important. First, an explanation allows predicting the when and the how. Second, the 
arguments provide the connection with ethics: arguments about fairness is what ethics deals with. 
Here, the empirical results potentially reveal which ethical ideas people do think are relevant in this 
context. Philosophers arguing for a contextual approach of justice often mention four central 
distributive principles, namely equality, need, desert (contribution) and efficiency (free exchange, 
welfare) (Elster, 1991a, p. 279; Miller, 1999, p. 18; Walzer, 1983, pp. 21–26). While efficiency and 
equality play a central role in economic and political theory, need and desert seem to play a rather 
important role in popular thinking about justice and fairness. Both the idea of needs (O’Neill et al., 
2008, pp. 192–195; Wiggins, 1987) and desert are complex concepts but here we use two rather 
simple definitions. Needs can be defined as ‘those conditions that allowed people to lead a minimally 
decent life in their society’ (Miller, 1999, p. 210). Desert refers to the link between undertaking a 
valuable activity and a received benefit – for instance, ‘because of outstanding academic research she 
deserves the Nobel prize’ (Miller, 1999, pp. 131–155).  
 Fairness attitudes can relate to desert. For example, a seller raises the price for drinks on a hot 
day (excess demand). He has however not put any extra effort in In other words, the seller is not seen 
as ‘deserving’ this extra income. Another example, a seller raises prices because he learnt his 
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consumers will not go elsewhere because of increased transport costs (changed price elasticity). Also 
here the seller earns extra money without extra effort, which can be perceived as ‘undeserved’ and 
thus unfair. Something similar applies to the element of willingness to pay at the consumer-side. For 
instance, because of a snow storm, half of the speed trains had to be cancelled (Raux et al., 2009) and 
one option is to allocate scarce seats by pricing, but this was perceived as unfair. The underlying 
question people ask themselves is probably why someone with more money should get access while 
other do not (willingness-to-pay). More income is not seen as a good basis to deserve this 
exceptionally scarce good. Therefore, a plausible explanation of the perceived unfairness of pricing is 
that people think earning money by just using market features (excess demand, price elasticity, 
willingness-to-pay) is undeserving and thus unfair. The cost-based argument relates to this: if a seller 
is confronted with higher costs, a price rise is acceptable – he does not ‘deserve’ a loss because of 
increased cost and, conversely, if costs do not increase, he does not ‘deserve’ a higher price.  
 Second, fairness attitudes can relate to ‘needs’. Needs do not only refer to ‘basic goods’, but 
also to a broader category of dependency; ‘I need this’ often means that there are little alternatives. 
This is for instance clear in the difference between reoccurring and exceptional situations. If the train 
cancellation is exceptional, one might have little alternatives. An allocation mechanism based on 
willingness-to-pay, and thus partly on ability-to-pay, may infuriate people. Since everyone needs to 
get at his destination, people do not see why someone with more money should get easier access to, 
for instance, trains. Richer people are not seen as deserving it or as having special needs, contrary to, 
for instance, pregnant women or elderly. It is therefore no surprise that people tend to prefer other 
allocation methods above pricing in such situations, such as lotteries, queuing and moral rules (e.g. 
priority for pregnant women, elderly and disabled people). Also all the forms of so-called market 
exploitation discussed above relate to needs: excess demand might be an indicator for needs (e.g. 
drinks on an exceptional hot day), low price elasticity could indicate needs (e.g. needing electricity for 
basic lightning), and low willingness-to-pay might relate to low ability to pay (e.g. someone poor and 
ill who needs medication). Implementing peak price implies that peak use will become less accessible 
to some users, also some could be more in need of it, which will appear unfair to many people. This is 
probably harder to remedy, but it could for instance require a way of compensating those who lose 
(Lindsey, 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002). Also the desire for predictability 
refers to need and dependency. If something is unpredictable, one is unable to look for alternatives. 
Indignation about pricing probably increases if it concerns exceptional situations or real (basic) needs, 
such as drinking water or basic energy provision. 
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Given these unfairness perceptions, the arguments given by the provider for pricing are 
crucial. Economic arguments for peak pricing or reducing use do not seem to convince people. An 
important part of the argument concerns not only the reason but also the use of the revenues. In 
particular, peak pricing for road, rail or parking becomes more acceptable if the revenues are used for 
creating extra supply. Here, acceptance increases because pricing is not just perceived as exploitation 
(extra profit), but as a way to address a significant problem. The trustworthiness of such an argument 
relates also to the trust people have in the agent himself (Raux et al., 2009, p. 235). 
 
Table 2. Overview fairness attitudes and peak pricing: reasons, interpretations and mediation 
Reason 
Peak pricing is perceived as unfair 
if it is … 
Interpretation 
The  explanation that people see peak 
pricing as unfair is that … 
Mediation 
Possible ways of moderating 
unfairness perception: 
not cost-based if one is not confronted with higher 
costs, the producer does not deserve a 
higher price 
 
▪ relate price to costs 
▪ clarify relation with costs 
market exploitation 
(using market features just to 
increase profit) 
 
excess demand, people’s price elasticity 
and higher ability to pay (part of WTP) 
are not seen as a good reason for 
deserving more profit 
 
 
excess demand, low price elasticity and 
low ability to pay (part of WTP) might 
be indicators of needs (dependency) 
▪ use revenues to address problems 
at stake (e.g. additional supply) 
▪ increase trust in agency (e.g. by 
consultation and participation) 
▪ consider compensatory measures 
 
▪ guarantee minimal provision 
unpredictable 
 
unpredictable events allow for little 
alternatives (dependency) 
 
▪ apply to reoccurring situation 
rather than to exceptional ones 
▪ provide more information about 




3.3 Ethical perspective: Normative criteria for distributing common costs 
The previous section provides an interpretation of fairness attitudes, but we also need to look at a more 
‘objective’ account of fairness. What matters is not only people’s opinions, but rather which are the 
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best arguments about what constitutes fairness. These arguments are the subject of ethics and theories 
of justices, such as those of Rawls (Rawls, 1971), Miller (1999), Dworkin (2000) and Nozick (1974). 
Here, given our interest in practical issues, we just need the rather general principles.  
 Besides general and well-supported, the list of principles should, secondly, also be 
encompassing, meaning that they should encompass all the relevant dimensions. Fairness can relate to 
almost all dimensions of life, ranging from lying to distributing environmental bads. The question at 
stake here is how to distribute a common cost. What could be the ideal-type options for a fair 
distribution of a common cost? Imagine the following example where a common cost has to be split: a 
common path in the neighbourhood leads to some common allotment gardens: how should the costs 
for the laying of the path be divided? To divide the common costs, one can distinguish five alternative 
ideal-type options: a) equal allocation, b) allocation based on costs, c) allocation based on ability to 
pay, d) allocation based on benefits derived from the good and e) allocation according to the desire to 
have the good. Whether a particular option is more fair will depend to a large extent on the particular 
good that has to be allocated.  
 These five options express also to a certain extent the different dimension of the fairness 
problem at stake. Equality can refer to strict (outcome) equality – such as a flat tariff – but it can also 
be interpreted more minimally, namely as referring to formal equal treatment (Elster, 1991b), namely 
people from the same class or group should be treated equally, conform Aristotle’s principle 
(Gosepath, 2011) 'equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally, in proportion to their 
relevant similarities and differences' (Isaac et al., 1991, p. 333).  
 The design option ‘ability to pay’ can refer to two related but different ideas in theories of 
justice, namely basic needs and distributive justice, in common language often referred to as poverty 
and inequality. Without basic needs being met people are not able to participate to society and without 
the possibility of participation people cannot contribute to society (Shue, 1980). Access to electricity 
and a basic level of electricity provision seem to fall under the label of basic needs in our societies; 
both are a precondition for participation. With regard to electricity, this is often discussed under the 
label 'energy poverty':6 energy should be affordable. Fulfilling basic needs is different from realising a 
just distribution. A common strategy in normative theorizing about distributive justice is to imagine an 
                                                     
6
 There are different definitions of energy poverty: fuel poverty ratio (more than 10 % income on heating) (Hills, 
2011, p. 29); 'low income-high cost' ratio (Hills, 2012, 2011); subjective measures; or having arrears on utility 
bills (Bouzarovski, 2014, pp. 282–283). 
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equal starting point7 and subsequently examine the acceptable reasons to depart from equality – such 
as efficiency, liberty, need and desert (Dworkin, 2000; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1999). Rather than 
looking for a principle for an optimal or perfectly just distribution, here we just need a minimal, non-
ideal distributive justice criterion. We can assume that (a) actual levels of inequality are probably 
unjustified8 and (b) the level of electricity consumption is not related to ‘deserving’ more income.9 A 
minimal and relevant distributive justice criterion can be the following: the provision of electricity as 
such should not increase of inequality.10 If not realised by the tariff itself, then the criterion serves to 
see whether additional, compensatory social-policy measures are required.  
 The idea of costs is related to a central distinction with regard to justice, already made by 
Aristotle, namely between distributive and corrective justice: distributive justice deals with a just 
distribution of goods and bads, while corrective (or restorative or retributive) justice deals with a 
violation of an accepted entitlement. In a very general way, retributive justice requires that harm 
should be prevented, or, if caused, that costs should be compensated. For electricity this can mean two 
things. First, Society should not bear the costs of non-basic preference satisfaction and therefore the 
consumer should pay for the costs made for making the electricity provision possible. In tariff setting 
this is the so-called cost causation principle. Second, electricity provision can also create costs which 
are not priced by the market, namely negative externalities, such as carbon emissions.11 A justice 
principle would require the prevention of such externalities or the full internalisation of externalities. 
While important, we will leave this principle aside here because carbon emissions are primarily a 
consequence of production and not of the network.  
 The benefit-based option relates to so-called cross-subsidies: while all groups pay the same, 
some groups derive more benefits from it (e.g. football stadium paid by tax budget). This goes against 
a kind of impartiality: why should one group get more benefits? The assumption is often that different 
cross-subsidies level out if taken together, but for large investments, such as an electricity network, it 
might be relevant to look at the particular cross-subsidies. Based on Wicksell's view on taxation, 
                                                     
7
 For instance Rawls' veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971), Dworkin's shipwreck survivors island (Dworkin, 1981) 
and Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example (Nozick, 1974). 
8
 For instance, in 2014 for the Netherlands: the richest decile had 61% of the total wealth, while the first six 
deciles (0-60%) had 1% of the total wealth (negative wealth included); and the ratio between the first and tenth 
decile with regard to the standardised gross income exceeded a factor of 160 (Kremer et al., 2014, pp. 48, 83).  
9
 Of course, it is possible that what one does with the electricity gives desert-based reasons for inequality, but 
this relates to the activity made possible by energy provision rather than its provision itself and its price or tariff.  
10
 Several indicators of equality are possible: Gini coefficient, relative or nominal differences, etc. 
11
 Other negative externalities are more local, such as landscape changes and electromagnetic fields. The 
externality of network congestion is not mentioned here because the topic here is exactly the internalisation of 
the congestion costs.  
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David Miller argues in the case of public goods for a principle of equalising net benefits as far as 
possible (Miller, 2004, p. 143) – the net benefits are the individual benefits (e.g. WTP) minus the 
individual costs (e.g. tax). For the example of the football stadium this would imply that football 
spectators pay a higher contribution (tax) than non-football spectators. This relates to a common view 
in network regulation: 'Tariffs should be designed to recover class revenues in proportion to the cost-
of-service of each class' (Brown and Faruqui, 2014, p. 4). 
 The idea of desire-based is more complex here. With regard to electricity consumption it 
seems hard to distinguish desires from benefits and thus the normative principle underlying is 
probably the same, namely the cost-causation principle.  
 While all these principles refer to the justice literature, they are also present in economics. The 
economic theory of taxation distinguishes two main principles to distribute the tax burden. The first is 
the ability to pay or (equal) sacrifice principle, associated with authors such as John S. Mill, Arthur C. 
Pigou and Francis E. Edgeworth. The principle states that individuals should contribute according to 
their capacity to bear it.12 The idea of not increasing current inequalities is related to the idea of ability 
to pay. If contributions are made according to ability to pay, current inequalities should ideally not 
increase. The second one is the benefit principle, associated with Knut Wicksell and Erik Lindahl, 
namely that taxes should be proportional to the benefits individuals derive from public goods 
(Musgrave, 2008; Neumark and McLure, 2016; O’Neill, 2000). The benefit principle is obviously 
related to the idea of equalising net benefits. These evaluative criteria can now be used to look at peak 
pricing and to contrast peak pricing with the other tariff schemes discussed in Section 3.1 (see Table 
3). 
  
                                                     
12
 Further distinctions are made between equal absolute, equal proportional and equal marginal sacrifice. 
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Table 3. Ethical assessment of network tariffs 
  Tariff design options 







Ramsey pricing Peak pricing 
























(a) Meeting basic 
needs 
 
− / + 
 
(+ if socialised 
through progressive 
taxes) 
− / + 
 
(requires study on 
relation use levels 




low elasticity and 
thus high prices) 
− 
 
(peak use probably 
less accessible to less 
well-off) 
 (b) No increase of 
inequality 
− / + 
 
(+ if socialised 
through progressive 
taxes) 
− / + 
 
(requires study on 
relation use levels 




low elasticity and 
thus high prices) 
− / + 
 
(requires study on 
relation peak use and 
income levels) 









(kWh & kW are 









(higher price if 
network faces 
congestion costs) 







(everyone pays the 














(because of mix 
preference intensity 
and ability to pay are 
benefits unclear) 
+ (− / +) 
 
(those benefitting 
from peak use 
contribute 
more/requires study 
on relation peak and 
non-peak use) 
Legend. − : the tariff design scores negatively on this criterion; + : the tariff design scores positively on this 
criterion; − / + : whether the tariff scores negatively or positively depends on empirical relations or on 
implementation choices; ? : assessment is unclear  
* For all tariff options it is assumed they are sufficient to cover the costs. 
 
Two tariff schemes score relatively badly in this table, namely the flat rate and Ramsey pricing. The 
bad scoring of a flat rate should not come as a surprise, since it is by definition insensitive for all types 
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of criteria (costs, income, benefits). That does not necessarily imply that this tariff is very unfair. Not 
only might a flat rate embody a symbolic equality – the same rate for everyone – it is possible that the 
negative judgments balance each other out overall. 
 Ramsey pricing (inverse elasticity rule) depends on estimates about price elasticity. According 
to Brown and Faruqui (2014, pp. 5, 30), two assumptions are commonly made: first, it is assumed that 
households are less price elastic than industrial users and, second, that within the class of households 
low-use electricity customers are less price elastic than high-use costumers. The argument for the latter 
is that high-use consumers use more electricity for luxuries, which can be more easily reduced, while 
low-use, less-off consumers use electricity mainly for essential services, which cannot be so easily 
reduced. Therefore, Ramsey suggests a higher tariff for households than for industrial users and a 
declining tariff for household: more use implies a proportionally lower tariff (Brown and Faruqui, 
2014, pp. 5, 30). (Such assumptions are, however, an empirical matter and different data could put 
forward different assumptions.13) Ramsey pricing is therefore controversial with regard to fairness. For 
instance, Kenneth Train calculated what Ramsey pricing would mean if applied to public transport in 
San Francisco Bay: it 'would require that low-income riders of the bus subsidize the higher-income 
riders (…) From an equity perspective, this arrangement would be unsuitable' (Train, 1991, p. 144). 
Ramsey pricing is also the only scheme that is not realising the first criterion, namely formal equal 
treatment. The problem is that price elasticity is both morally arbitrary – it does not say anything about 
needs, capacities or merits – and average numbers are applied to individuals. Therefore, it is perhaps 
no surprise that Ramsey pricing has not really been used for grid tariffs. 'Ramsey pricing has rarely 
been applied, at least not explicitly, for price discrimination across customers in the same class. The 
main reason is that equity considerations have stood in the way' (Brown and Faruqui, 2014, p. 5). 
 The cost-based tariff-design options (transport and capacity charge) and the income-based 
design option (socialised through taxes) are successful in correspondence with their design concept, 
namely as either a way to represent costs or in being income-sensitive, but the downside is that they 
both score worse on the criteria of the other dimension: if income-sensitive, then less cost-sensitive, 
and conversely.  Peak pricing, our subject here, represents an interesting case. While peak pricing is 
valued rather negative if we look at people’s fairness perceptions, the judgement is more complex if 
we look at evaluative criteria put forward from an ethical perspective. Contrary to people’s attitudes 
                                                     
13
 For instance, a study examining electricity consumption in California found that the price elasticity was lower 
for high levels of electricity use. The explanation is that a significant group was dependent on electric space 
heating. Nonetheless, the price sensitivity of higher incomes was a bit lower than this of lower incomes, 
probably because households replace their electric heating as income rises and become less dependent of 
electricity prices (Reiss and White, 2005). 
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towards peak pricing, there is a link between this tariff scheme and costs and/or benefits: people using 
peak capacity create a cost for the network and they also benefit by using this scarce capacity. 
Nonetheless, the relation with affordability and inequality is less straightforward, especially the fact 
that it may exclude some people from peak use for essential activities.  
 
4. Integrated overview and discussion 
We now bring the three perspectives together in the integrated overview table below. Just as before, 
we use a dichotomous scale (‘+’ ; ‘−’), with a third item (‘− / +’) indicating uncertainty or dependence. 
While limited, for the purposes here such a dichotomous scale suffices and reduces discretionary 
judgments.  
Table 4. Integrated assessment: 3-perspectives’ multi-criteria and comparison with other tariff 
options 







Ramsey pricing Peak pricing 
Economic 
Allocative 
efficiency − − / + + + 
Behavioural
-economic 
Cost-based − + − − / +  
Non-exploitation + +   − 5  − 6 





+ + − + 
Meeting basic 
needs 
− / + − / + − − 
No increase 
inequality 
− / + − / + − − / + 
Cost causation − + − + 
Equalise net 
benefits 
− + ? + (− / +) 
Legend. − : the tariff scores negatively on this criterion; + : the tariff scores positively on this criterion; − / + : 
whether the tariff scores negatively or positively depends on empirical relations or on implementation choices; ? 
: the assessment is  unclear. 
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If one looks at the tariffs from such an integrated fairness perspective, the relatively positive scoring of 
transport and capacity charges stands out. It is their relation to costs, both actually and perceived, that 
makes them attractive. Moreover, the relation with capacity to pay (judged as ‘depends’ in table) is 
contingent: it depends on the relation between use levels and income levels. In order words, while it is 
possible that there is relatively higher burden for the least well-off, this is not necessarily the case.  
 Moving away from such cost-based tariff, the regulator has two options. Either one moves to a 
less efficient tariff that possibly takes more equality considerations into account, or one moves to a 
more efficient tariff structure. The first option refers to a more flat tariff, possibly partly socialised. 
Such a tariff is neither very efficient nor cost sensitive, but at the other hand, it is very predictable, 
expresses a strong formal and symbolic equality and allows room – in the case of progressive taxes – 
for adjustments with regard to income inequality.  
 The alternative implies moving towards a tariff aimed at more efficiency. A theoretically 
attractive option for dividing common costs is Ramsey pricing, which allows maximising efficiency 
(without allowing financial loss for grid operators). However, as we have seen in our ethical 
discussion on tariffs, this tariff scores the worst with regard to fairness criteria, both from an ethical 
and behavioural-economic perspective. And, as mentioned before, this seems to be confirmed by 
reality, since it is rarely used in practice for grid tariffs. 
 This brings us to peak pricing. From an integrated perspective, peak-pricing design presents 
the most ambiguous result: positive for efficiency, negative with regard to fairness perceptions and 
nuanced from an ethical perspective. This ambiguous nature makes that the fairness perception and 
evaluation depends to a greater extent on the concrete implementation.  
 
5. Policy implications 
The fact that the fairness of peak pricing depends on the modalities of its implementation, gives 
significant room for incorporating fairness into the design of peak pricing. While the ethical 
perspective allows to make an overall judgement of the different tariff schemes, for the conditions for 
mediating we also need to look backwards at the behavioural-economic findings about which 
conditions effectively change fairness and its perception. 
 First, making peak pricing acceptable requires explaining the arguments for peak pricing in 
common language. Allocative efficiency is an important economic notion, but does not necessarily 
appeal to common language. People might see peak pricing as more acceptable if, for instance, the 
revenues are used for something related to what peak pricing is supposed to address (e.g. network 
capacity, provide batteries, stimulate domestic energy efficiency, etc.). 
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 Second, a major problem with peak pricing is that it could exclude the least well-off from 
(minimal) peak use; people deem this unfair because it hinders people from fulfilling certain needs. 
Increasing fairness requires attention for basic needs.  
 Third, peak pricing conflicts with many desert-based ways of reasoning, such as why do 
higher income groups deserve easier access to peak use or why does the network provider deserve the 
extra income from peak pricing? The  acceptability can be raised by changing the use of the revenues, 
adding compensatory measures; changing the reference point in the pricing (e.g. non-peak users earn 
credits to reward them for their non-use:) or selling (peak) capacity access in advance (Doorman, 
2005))  
 Fourth, the empirical research on fairness attitudes also revealed that predictability is 
important. This is a challenge for peak pricing, but since most peaks are somewhat predictable in 
advance, consumers could be given notice sufficiently in advance. One could also think of formulating 
a cap on the maximum amount of peak periods.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper aims at assessing network tariffs from a fairness perspective. Much of the literature dealing 
with ‘energy justice’ discusses either general issues about energy and justice (Heffron et al., 2015; 
Jones et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2013) or discusses the decision-making process of new power 
infrastructure, such as nuclear plants (Visschers and Siegrist, 2012) wind farms (Ottinger et al., 2014) 
or grid lines (Knudsen et al., 2015). If research is focused on network tariffs (Muir, 2001; Wood and 
Carter, 2014), it often does not clarify the meaning of fairness and neither does it provide a method to 
assess the fairness of particular tariffs. This article departs from the perceived tension between 
efficiency and acceptability. One can only go beyond this tension by using an integrated approach that 
combines insights from efficiency, acceptability and fairness. It is particularly the ethical perspective 
that allows transcending the impasse: understanding the underlying normative arguments and 
contrasting perceptions with insights from ethics makes it possible to formulate conclusions beyond 
that tension, and in addition this allows clarifying the notion of fairness.   
 Looking through the lens of this integrated approach at peak pricing allows us to assess its 
consequences for fairness. While other tariff schemes are less (e.g. transport and capacity charges) or 
more (e.g. Ramsey pricing) controversial with regard to fairness, the fairness of peak pricing is more 
ambiguous and contingent upon the concrete implementation design. We identified four possible 
implementation conditions for improving the fairness of peak pricing. The arguments used to explain 
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peak pricing should appeal to common language and common normative notions. Moreover, one 
should guarantee the satisfaction of basic needs if they would be threatened by peak pricing. The 
worry that peak use is only for the rich or only for the enrichment of the provider should be addressed 
as well. Some possibilities for making peak prices more fair are related to the use of revenues, the 
existence of compensatory measures and the choice of the reference point. Finally, people attach much 
value to predictability and this should thus be maximised as much as possible. If one takes such 
conditions into account, the acceptability and fairness of peak pricing will be fostered.  
 
References 
Biggar, D., 2010. Fairness in Public-utility Regulation: A Theory. Agenda A J. Policy Anal. Reform 
17, 5–29. 
Bouzarovski, S., 2014. Energy poverty in the European Union: landscapes of vulnerability. WIREs 
Energy Environ. 3, 276–289. 
Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2013. A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2002. Behavioural science: Homo reciprocans. Nature 415, 125–128. 
Brown, T., Faruqui, A., 2014. Structure of Electricity Distribution Network Tariffs: Recovery of 
Residual Costs. Report prepared for the Austrelian Energy Market Commission. 
Brown, T., Faruqui, A., Grausz, L., 2015. Efficient tariff structures for distribution network services. 
Econ. Anal. Policy 48, 139–149. 
Coase, R.H., 1946. The Marginal Cost Controversy. Economica 13, 169–182. doi:10.2307/2549764 
Doorman, G., 2005. Capacity Subscription: Solving the Peak Demand Challenge in Electricity 
Markets. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 20, 239–245. 
Duffy, J.F., 2004. The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 
71, 37–56. 
Dworkin, R., 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Dworkin, R., 1981. What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. Philos. Public Aff. 10, 283–345. 
Elmaghrab, W., Keskinocak, P., 2003. Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations: 
Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future Directions. Manage. Sci. 49, 1287–1309. 
Elster, J., 1991a. Local justice. How institutions allocate scarce goods and necessary burdens. Eur. 
Econ. Rev. 35, 273–291. 
Elster, J., 1991b. Local justice. Eur. Econ. Rev. 35, 273–291. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(91)90128-6 
21 
 
Frey, B.S., Pommerehne, W.W., 1993. On the fairness of pricing — An empirical survey among the 
general population. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 20, 295–307. 
Gosepath, S., 2011. Equality, in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2011 Edition). 
Heffron, R.J., Mccauley, D., Sovacool, B.K., 2015. Resolving society’s energy trilemma through the 
Energy Justice Metric. Energy Policy 87, 168–176. 
Hills, J., 2012. Getting the measure of fuel poverty: final report of the Fuel Poverty Review. 
CASEreport, 72. London, UK. 
Hills, J., 2011. Fuel poverty: the problem and its measurement. CASEreport, 69. London, UK. 
Hotelling, H., 1938. The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and 
Utility Rates. Econometrica 6, 242–269. doi:10.2307/1907054 
Isaac, R.M., Mathieu, D., Zajac, E.E., 1991. Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness. Const. 
Polit. Econ. 2, 329–370. doi:10.1007/BF02393135 
Jones, B.R., Sovacool, B.K., Sidortsov, R. V., 2015. Making the Ethical and Philosophical Case for 
“Energy Justice.” Environ. Ethics 37, 145–168. 
Jones, D.N., Mann, P.C., 2001. The Fairness Criterion in Public Utility Regulation: Does Fairness Still 
Matter? J. Econ. Issues 35, 153–172. doi:10.1080/00213624.2001.11506345 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., Thaler, R., 1986. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: 
Entitlements in the Market. Am. Econ. Rev. 76, 728–741. 
Knudsen, J.K., Wold, L.C., Aas, Ø., Kielland Haug, J.J., Batel, S., Devine-Wright, P., Qvenild, M., 
Jacobsen, G.B., 2015. Local perceptions of opportunities for engagement and procedural justice 
in electricity transmission grid projects in Norway and the UK. Land use policy 48, 299–308. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.04.031 
Konow, J., 2003. Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories. J. Econ. 
Lit. 41, 1188–1239. 
Kremer, M., Bovens, M., Schrijvers, E., Went, R., 2014. Hoe ongelijk is Nederland? Een verkenning 
van de ontwikkeling en gevolgen van economische ongelijkheid. AUP, Amsterdam. 
Krugman, P., 2000. Reckonings; What Price Fairness? New York Times. 
Lindsey, R., 2006. Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Road Pricing?The intellectual history of an 
idea. Econ J. Watch 3, 292–379. 
Littlechild, S.C., 2000. Why we need electricity retailers: A reply to Joskow on wholesale spot price 
pass-through, Judge Institute of Management Studies. Cambridge. 
Miller, C.A., Iles, A., Jones, C.F., 2013. The Social Dimensions of Energy Transitions. Sci. Cult. 
(Lond). 22, 135–148. 
22 
 
Miller, D., 2004. Justice, Democracy and Public Goods, in: Dowding, K.M., Goodin, R.E., Pateman, 
C. (Eds.), Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp. 127–149. 
Miller, D., 1999. Principles of Social Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Muir, J., 2001. Fair pricing regulation. Agenda 8, 3–18. 
Musgrave, R.A., 2008. Public finance, in: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (Eds.), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. 
Neumark, F., McLure, C.E., 2016. Taxation, in: Encyclopædia Britannica. 
Nozick, R., 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Blackwell, Oxford. 
O’Neill, J., Holland, A., Light, A., 2008. Environmental Values. Routledge, London. 
O’Neill, J.R., 2000. The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis. Soc. Choice Welfare 
17, 117–124. 
Oberholzer-Gee, F., Weck-Hannemann, H., 2002. Pricing road use: politico-economic and fairness 
considerations. Transp. Res. Part D Transp. Environ. 7, 357–371. doi:10.1016/S1361-
9209(02)00005-6 
Ottinger, G., Hargrave, T.J., Hopson, E., 2014. Procedural justice in wind facility siting: 
Recommendations for state-led siting processes. Energy Policy 65, 662–669. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.09.066 
Raux, C., Souche, S., Croissant, Y., 2009. How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study. 
Public Choice 139, 227–240. doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9390-y 
Rawls, J., 1999. A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. Belknap Press of Harvard Univeristy Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice, Revised. ed. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Reiss, P.C., White, M.W., 2005. Household Electricity Demand, Revisited. Rev. Econ. Stud. 72, 853–
883. doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00354 
Shue, H., 1980. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
Steg, L., Vlek, C., 2009. Encouraging pro-environmental behaviour: An integrative review and 
research agenda. J. Environ. Psychol. 29, 309–317. doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2008.10.004 
Surowiecki, J., 2014. In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging. MIT Technol. Rev. September, 74–77. 
Train, K.E., 1991. Optimal Regulation. The Economic Theory of Natural Monopolies. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
van den Bos, K., Lind, A.E., Wilke, H.A.M., 2001. The psychology of procedural and distributive 
justice viewed from the perspective of fairness heuristic theory, in: Cropanzano, R. (Ed.), Justice 
23 
 
in the Workplace. From Theory to Practice. Volume 2. Laurence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, 
NJ, pp. 49–66. 
Verhoef, E.T., Nijkamp, P., Rietveld, P., 1997. The social feasibility of road pricing: A case study for 
the Randstad area. J. Transp. Econ. Policy 31, 255–276. 
Vickrey, W., 1971. Responsive Pricing of Public Utility Services. Bell J. Econ. Manag. Sci. 2, 337–
346. doi:10.2307/3003171 
Visschers, V.H.M., Siegrist, M., 2012. Fair play in energy policy decisions: Procedural fairness, 
outcome fairness and acceptance of the decision to rebuild nuclear power plants. Energy Policy 
46, 292–300. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.062 
Walzer, M., 1983. Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Basic Books, New York. 
Wiggins, D., 1987. Needs, Values, Truth. Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Wood, T., Carter, L., 2014. Fair pricing for power. Grattan Inst. Rep. 2014-8, 1–39. 
Xia, L., Monroe, K.B., Cox, J.L., 2004. The Price Is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of Price 
Fairness Perceptions. J. Mark. 68, 1–15. doi:10.1509/jmkg.68.4.1.42733 











List of research reports 
 
 
12001-HRM&OB: Veltrop, D.B., C.L.M. Hermes, T.J.B.M. Postma and J. de Haan, A Tale 
of Two Factions: Exploring the Relationship between Factional Faultlines and Conflict 
Management in Pension Fund Boards 
 
12002-EEF: Angelini, V. and J.O. Mierau, Social and Economic Aspects of Childhood 
Health: Evidence from Western-Europe 
 
12003-Other: Valkenhoef, G.H.M. van, T. Tervonen, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, Clinical 
trials information in drug development and regulation: existing systems and standards 
 
12004-EEF: Toolsema, L.A. and M.A. Allers, Welfare financing: Grant allocation and 
efficiency 
 
12005-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, The Global Financial Crisis 
and currency crises in Latin America 
 
12006-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and E. Sterken, Participation and Performance at the London 
2012 Olympics 
 
12007-Other: Zhao, J., G.H.M. van Valkenhoef, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, ADDIS: an 
automated way to do network meta-analysis 
 
12008-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Individualism and the cultural roots of management 
practices 
 
12009-EEF: Dungey, M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs, J. Tian and S. van Norden, On trend-cycle 
decomposition and data revision 
 
12010-EEF: Jong-A-Pin, R., J-E. Sturm and J. de Haan, Using real-time data to test for 
political budget cycles 
 
12011-EEF: Samarina, A., Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics: An 
empirical analysis 
 
12012-EEF: Alessie, R., V. Angelini and P. van Santen, Pension wealth and household 
savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE 
 
13001-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border infrastructure constraints, 
regulatory measures and economic integration of the Dutch – German gas market 
 
13002-EEF: Klein Goldewijk, G.M. and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, The relation between stature and 
long bone length in the Roman Empire 
 
13003-EEF: Mulder, M. and L. Schoonbeek, Decomposing changes in competition in the 
Dutch electricity market through the Residual Supply Index 
 
13004-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border constraints, institutional changes 











13005-EEF: Wiese, R., Do political or economic factors drive healthcare financing 
privatisations? Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
13006-EEF: Elhorst, J.P., P. Heijnen, A. Samarina and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, State transfers at 
different moments in time: A spatial probit approach 
 
13007-EEF: Mierau, J.O., The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, 
and environment 
 
13008-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, The effect of industry structure and 
yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study 
 
13009-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Values of financial services professionals and the global 
financial crisis as a crisis of ethics 
 
13010-EEF: Boonman, T.M., Sovereign defaults, business cycles and economic growth in 
Latin America, 1870-2012 
 
13011-EEF: He, X., J.P.A.M Jacobs, G.H. Kuper and J.E. Ligthart, On the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the euro area 
 
13012-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Generational shifts in managerial values and the coming 
of a global business culture 
 
13013-EEF: Samarina, A. and J.E. Sturm, Factors leading to inflation targeting – The 
impact of adoption 
 
13014-EEF: Allers, M.A. and E. Merkus, Soft budget constraint but no moral hazard? The 
Dutch local government bailout puzzle 
 
13015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust and management: Explaining cross-national 
differences in work autonomy 
 
13016-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, Sovereign debt crises in 
Latin America: A market pressure approach 
 
13017-GEM: Oosterhaven, J., M.C. Bouwmeester and M. Nozaki, The impact of 
production and infrastructure shocks: A non-linear input-output programming approach, 
tested on an hypothetical economy 
 
13018-EEF: Cavapozzi, D., W. Han and R. Miniaci, Alternative weighting structures for 
multidimensional poverty assessment 
 
14001-OPERA: Germs, R. and N.D. van Foreest, Optimal control of production-inventory 
systems with constant and compound poisson demand 
 
14002-EEF: Bao, T. and J. Duffy, Adaptive vs. eductive learning: Theory and evidence 
 
14003-OPERA: Syntetos, A.A. and R.H. Teunter, On the calculation of safety stocks 
 
14004-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., J. Oosterhaven and J.M. Rueda-Cantuche, Measuring 
the EU value added embodied in EU foreign exports by consolidating 27 national supply 











14005-OPERA: Prak, D.R.J., R.H. Teunter and J. Riezebos, Periodic review and 
continuous ordering 
 
14006-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., The college gender gap reversal: Insights from a life-cycle 
perspective 
 
14007-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., Child care subsidies with endogenous education and 
fertility 
 
14008-EEF: Otter, P.W., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and A.H.J. den Reijer, A criterion for the number 
of factors in a data-rich environment 
 
14009-EEF: Mierau, J.O. and E. Suari Andreu, Fiscal rules and government size in the 
European Union 
 
14010-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, Industry structure and collusion 
with uniform yardstick competition: theory and experiments 
 
14011-EEF: Huizingh, E. and M. Mulder, Effectiveness of regulatory interventions on firm 
behavior: a randomized field experiment with e-commerce firms 
 
14012-GEM: Bressand, A., Proving the old spell wrong: New African hydrocarbon 
producers and the ‘resource curse’ 
 
14013-EEF: Dijkstra P.T., Price leadership and unequal market sharing: Collusion in 
experimental markets 
 
14014-EEF: Angelini, V., M. Bertoni, and L. Corazzini, Unpacking the determinants of life 
satisfaction: A survey experiment 
 
14015-EEF: Heijdra, B.J., J.O. Mierau, and T. Trimborn, Stimulating annuity markets 
 
14016-GEM: Bezemer, D., M. Grydaki, and L. Zhang, Is financial development bad for 
growth? 
 
14017-EEF: De Cao, E. and C. Lutz, Sensitive survey questions: measuring attitudes 
regarding female circumcision through a list experiment 
 
14018-EEF: De Cao, E., The height production function from birth to maturity 
 
14019-EEF: Allers, M.A. and J.B. Geertsema, The effects of local government 
amalgamation on public spending and service levels. Evidence from 15 years of municipal 
boundary reform 
 
14020-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and J.H. Veurink, Central bank independence and political 
pressure in the Greenspan era 
 
14021-GEM: Samarina, A. and D. Bezemer, Do Capital Flows Change Domestic Credit 
Allocation? 
 
14022-EEF: Soetevent, A.R. and L. Zhou, Loss Modification Incentives for Insurers Under 










14023-EEF: Allers, M.A. and W. Vermeulen, Fiscal Equalization, Capitalization and the 
Flypaper Effect. 
 
14024-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust, Workplace Organization, and Comparative 
Economic Development. 
 
14025-GEM: Bezemer, D., and L. Zhang, From Boom to Bust in de Credit Cycle: The Role 
of Mortgage Credit. 
 
14026-GEM: Zhang, L., and D. Bezemer, How the Credit Cycle Affects Growth: The Role 
of Bank Balance Sheets. 
 
14027-EEF: Bružikas, T., and A.R. Soetevent, Detailed Data and Changes in Market 
Structure: The Move to Unmanned Gasoline Service Stations. 
 
14028-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., and B. Scholtens, Cross-border Spillovers from 
European Gas Infrastructure Investments. 
 
14029-EEF: Lestano, and G.H. Kuper, Correlation Dynamics in East Asian Financial 
Markets. 
 
14030-GEM: Bezemer, D.J., and M. Grydaki, Nonfinancial Sectors Debt and the U.S. 
Great Moderation. 
 
14031-EEF: Hermes, N., and R. Lensink, Financial Liberalization and Capital Flight: 
Evidence from the African Continent. 
 
14032-OPERA: Blok, C. de, A. Seepma, I. Roukema, D.P. van Donk, B. Keulen, and R. 
Otte, Digitalisering in Strafrechtketens: Ervaringen in Denemarken, Engeland, Oostenrijk 
en Estland vanuit een Supply Chain Perspectief. 
 
14033-OPERA: Olde Keizer, M.C.A., and R.H. Teunter, Opportunistic condition-based 
maintenance and aperiodic inspections for a two-unit series system. 
 
14034-EEF: Kuper, G.H., G. Sierksma, and F.C.R. Spieksma, Using Tennis Rankings to 
Predict Performance in Upcoming Tournaments 
 
15001-EEF: Bao, T., X. Tian, X. Yu, Dictator Game with Indivisibility of Money 
 
15002-GEM: Chen, Q., E. Dietzenbacher, and B. Los, The Effects of Ageing and 
Urbanization on China’s Future Population and Labor Force 
 
15003-EEF: Allers, M., B. van Ommeren, and B. Geertsema, Does intermunicipal 
cooperation create inefficiency? A comparison of interest rates paid by intermunicipal 
organizations, amalgamated municipalities and not recently amalgamated municipalities 
 
15004-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan, and M. Mulder, Design of Yardstick Competition 
and Consumer Prices: Experimental Evidence 
 












15006-EEF: Anufriev, M., T. Bao, A. Sutin, and J. Tuinstra, Fee Structure, Return Chasing 
and Mutual Fund Choice: An Experiment 
 
15007-EEF: Lamers, M., Depositor Discipline and Bank Failures in Local Markets During 
the Financial Crisis 
 
15008-EEF: Oosterhaven, J., On de Doubtful Usability of the Inoperability IO Model 
 
15009-GEM: Zhang, L. and D. Bezemer, A Global House of Debt Effect? Mortgages and 
Post-Crisis Recessions in Fifty Economies 
 
15010-I&O: Hooghiemstra, R., N. Hermes, L. Oxelheim, and T. Randøy, The Impact of 
Board Internationalization on Earnings Management 
 
15011-EEF: Haan, M.A., and W.H. Siekman, Winning Back the Unfaithful while Exploiting 
the Loyal: Retention Offers and Heterogeneous Switching Costs 
 
15012-EEF: Haan, M.A., J.L. Moraga-González, and V. Petrikaite, Price and Match-Value 
Advertising with Directed Consumer Search 
 
15013-EEF: Wiese, R., and S. Eriksen, Do Healthcare Financing Privatisations Curb Total 
Healthcare Expenditures? Evidence from OECD Countries 
 
15014-EEF: Siekman, W.H., Directed Consumer Search 
 
15015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Organizational Culture in the Financial Sector: Evidence 
from a Cross-Industry Analysis of Employee Personal Values and Career Success 
 
15016-EEF: Te Bao, and C. Hommes, When Speculators Meet Constructors: Positive and 
Negative Feedback in Experimental Housing Markets 
 
15017-EEF: Te Bao, and Xiaohua Yu, Memory and Discounting: Theory and Evidence 
 
15018-EEF: Suari-Andreu, E., The Effect of House Price Changes on Household Saving 
Behaviour: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of the Dutch Case 
 
15019-EEF: Bijlsma, M., J. Boone, and G. Zwart, Community Rating in Health Insurance: 
Trade-off between Coverage and Selection 
 
15020-EEF: Mulder, M., and B. Scholtens, A Plant-level Analysis of the Spill-over Effects 
of the German Energiewende 
 
15021-GEM: Samarina, A., L. Zhang, and D. Bezemer, Mortgages and Credit Cycle 
Divergence in Eurozone Economies 
 
16001-GEM: Hoorn, A. van, How Are Migrant Employees Manages? An Integrated 
Analysis 
 
16002-EEF: Soetevent, A.R., Te Bao, A.L. Schippers, A Commercial Gift for Charity 
 












16004-MARK: Holtrop, N., J.E. Wieringa, M.J. Gijsenberg, and P. Stern, Competitive 
Reactions to Personal Selling: The Difference between Strategic and Tactical Actions 
 
16005-EEF: Plantinga, A. and B. Scholtens, The Financial Impact of Divestment from 
Fossil Fuels 
 
16006-GEM: Hoorn, A. van, Trust and Signals in Workplace Organization: Evidence from 
Job Autonomy Differentials between Immigrant Groups 
 
16007-EEF: Willems, B. and G. Zwart, Regulatory Holidays and Optimal Network 
Expansion 
 
16008-GEF: Hoorn, A. van, Reliability and Validity of the Happiness Approach to 
Measuring Preferences 
 
16009-EEF: Hinloopen, J., and A.R. Soetevent, (Non-)Insurance Markets, Loss Size 
Manipulation and Competition: Experimental Evidence 
 
16010-EEF: Bekker, P.A., A Generalized Dynamic Arbitrage Free Yield Model 
 
16011-EEF: Mierau, J.A., and M. Mink, A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate 
Demand 
 
16012-EEF: Mulder, M. and B. Willems, Competition in Retail Electricity Markets: An 
Assessment of Ten Year Dutch Experience 
 
16013-GEM: Rozite, K., D.J. Bezemer, and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, Towards a Financial Cycle for 
the US, 1873-2014 
 
16014-EEF: Neuteleers, S., M. Mulder, and F. Hindriks, Assessing Fairness of Dynamic 
Grid Tariffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
